

Gov 20: Fall 2014

Section on the State and State-Building

1. State Capacity vs. State Scope [5 minutes]

1. Fukuyama gives us an interesting two by two to think about: Can you help me put it on the board?

[DRAW A VERY BIG TWO BY TWO] Two dimensions: CAPACITY v. SCOPE

2. Earlier this semester we read a whole debate ALONG THE SCOPE DIMENSION. Some of you wrote papers about it. What was the SCOPE dimension debate we saw in this course?

Lead them to some assortment of:

[ISI v. EOI, Bates v. Johnson, Acemoglu and Robinson. How much should state intervene in economy.]

ADD THEIR EXAMPLES TO THE 2x2 ON THE BOARD AS YOU GO

3. But we've also had a lot of theories/explanations that have involved this second dimension: CAPACITY. Let's go back and try to reconnect the dots on this: *Can you think of debates we've had earlier in the semester that are implicitly talking about this capacity dimension?*

Lead them to some assortment of:

-- In our readings about development, does state capacity come in at all? (YES, Acemoglu and Robinson. YES, Bates ISI fails because of state capacity. YES, Johnson, EOI works because of state capacity in East Asia)

-- What about our readings on revolutions? Does state capacity come in at all here? Which types of states (modern and pre-modern) are most vulnerable to revolution? (YES, agrarian bureaucracies. YES, sultanistic regimes) What happens when states are strong? Examples?

-- What about our readings on ethnic political competition and ethnic violence? Is state capacity a big lurking variable there? (YES, emphasize the Scott Straus Rwanda reading for them)

-- Ok, one more on: what about our readings on institutions. Does state capacity matter for the debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism and which one leads to better democratic survival? Is state capacity a counter-argument to Linz? (YES)

ADD THEIR EXAMPLES TO THE 2x2 ON THE BOARD AS YOU GO

2. Why Strong States in Europe? [10 minutes]

1. Why does Tilly believe "states" are like the mafia – organized crime rackets? Why is this a useful analogy?

2. How does "war make the state"? Can you walk us through the logic here?

-- **Is there a Darwinian logic here?** Is this an apt metaphor?

3. Who can tell me what the Magna Carta was? How does it relate to Tilly's theory?

-- Talk about evolution of parliaments – KINGS need to bargain with holders of capital to get their money. The kings aren't strong enough to just seize it, and that would be self-defeating, as it would ruin the economy. So they work out a deal. Some oversight, and you give me money.

3. Updates to other parts of the world [15 minutes]

1. Really big idea, so others try to apply it to other parts of the world. Can war explain the lack of strong states?

2. Why does Centeno think states are weaker in Latin America?

3. Earlier in course, and on your midterm, a lot of emphasis was placed on international context. What is the role of international context, decolonization in making this happen in Latin America?

4. Why does Herbst think states are weaker in Africa?

5. Why can't African post-independence leaders actually govern their whole territories?

6. What is the role of international context in explaining African state weakness? Role of colonial experience?

7. Are African warlords like Charles Taylor, who we talked about in lecture, warlords in the same sense that Tilly talked about warlords?

-- What about a "predatory" dictator like Mobutu? Is he at all like the feudal warlords Tilly described expropriating wealth in Europe? What are the key differences between these?

4. Slater / contentious politics: [5 minutes]

1. Slater gives us a different explanation. Puzzle: very strong and very weak states in SE Asia. Right next to each other. Very similar historical experiences until 20th century, yet in 20th century Singapore/Malyasia become powerful states, others remain highly chaotic and weak by comparison. What is explaining this difference?

2. Is this a fundamentally different logic than Tilly? Or actually the same?

5. OPEN DEBATE: "The million dollar question" [15 minutes]

1. Back to Fukuyama: We really want more state capacity in developing countries. But this literature tells us that we can only get it through (a) WAR; (b) Mass protest / upheaval leading to elite pact of authoritarianism. Herbst's prescription is a DARK ONE: let them fight it out and build states. We'll be better off in the long run. Let's assume we aren't that Machivelliean and can't stomach that. What can we do to get stronger states? **This is the BIG question in political economy of development right now – everyone wants the answer to this:**

-- Role for institutions? Which ones? How? What incentives to change?

-- Modernization/development?

-- Changes to foreign aid and Western intervention in developing world? (Steer conversation to Sachs v. Easterly debate, debates about aid "substituting for the state")

I let this be a very open ended conversation and let them take it where we wanted. We ended up talking about the US role in explaining state weakness in Iraq, debating ways to improve foreign aid to African states, and thinking about ways to improve “aid conditionality”. Steer them to these topics if they don’t get anywhere interesting themselves.