

Week 10 Lesson Plan

Housekeeping:

- will get papers back next week
- noticed that a bunch of you were not in lecture yesterday – encourage you to come to lecture the next two weeks. Not only is it required but will also be helpful during our class discussion + super interesting
- Start with Andrew/ Tiffany and Dan's presentation

Four readings to go over today: Russett (democratic peace and the shared institutions/culture argument), Fearon (audience costs), Lake (rent seeking), and Baum and Potter (the role of the media)

→ students spend 5 minutes in pairs talking about one of the readings, switch pairs, talk about a different reading. Readings somewhat technical/probably didn't do all of them, so they can be experts in at least two readings.

- What is the democratic peace? Why does it exist?
- The democratic peace correlation clearly holds in the data. But is the relationship causal? Are you convinced by the evidence?
- If the democratic peace is causal what are the most plausible mechanisms underpinning the association?

→ talk about liberal values (Russett)

- Why does Russett think that democracies don't fight each other? [shared values]
- Do you find Russett's theory convincing? What other things might be influencing democratic peace that appear to be shared values but actually aren't?
- Think back on yesterday's lecture – what is the golden arches theory of democratic peace?
 - o Could this be what is actually driving it?
 - o Constant seemed to think so – he said that war would cease and commerce would take over – commerce would be a substitute for war and fighting would cease. Is democratic peace actually just explained by globalization? Why or why not?

→ talk about rent seeking (Lake)

- What does Lake say? [Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other; more likely to win the wars that they do fight]
- What is Lake's mechanism? [Rent seeking: democracies earn fewer rents, enjoy greater social support for their policies, therefore greater extractive capacity. Don't need to seek rents. Rent seeking leads to imperialist bias because expansion reduces the benefits of citizen exit, provoking others into attacking creates a rally around the flag effect, more rent seeking ability → more revenue → larger the optimal size of the political unit]

→ Talk about audience costs (Fearon)

[DO SHELBY'S POKER EXERCISE HERE]

- How does the game we just played relate to audience costs?
- In theory, what should the bidding have looked like? (autocracies bluff more and bid more than democracies – can think of the three actions as attack, back down, or escalate – bid, fold, raise)
- what are audience costs? Where do they come from?
- How do they differ, according to Fearon between democracies and autocracies?
 - o [democracies are more beholden to their public/audience, so any military action they take is a more credible signal to the opponent about their seriousness]
- How do audience costs translate into democratic peace? [democracies are better able to signal properly, so it ameliorates the security dilemma between democratic states. Security dilemma = cold war type stockpiling]
 - o Is this really a story about democratic peace or more about miscommunication? If the miscommunication disappeared, would the fighting disappear as well?
- Do you buy Fearon's story?
 - o Why don't autocracies face audience costs?
 - o Think back to the discussion about Putin that we had last week – he needs legitimacy from the people, that's why he holds elections. Are autocratic leaders like Putin more or less beholden to the domestic audience? Isn't Obama a lot more secure than Putin?
- Where would the media come into the audience cost theory? What does Fearon implicitly assume the role of the media is?

→ Bring in the media and other misc. questions

- Jasmine: Baum explains that the media shapes, or helps shape, public opinion about entering wars. The "rally effect" is one of the ways that politicians can secure support for wars. But how does public opinion affect when a war ends? Is it just when the rally dies down? Thinking of the Iraq War specifically, this doesn't seem to be the case—the war continued long after the public stopped supporting it. Given this, under what circumstances are leaders compelled to exit wars?
- Dan: We've talked through a bunch of alternative explanations: but maybe it's the media? To what extent can the media be thanked for the global decline in warfare that's emerged alongside the global increase in democratization?
- Matt Baum gave us a bunch of reasons yesterday why democratic peace theory is important – including the fact that political leaders use it as an excuse to promote democracy. Does the democratic peace theory actually cause political actions, or does it just sway political rhetoric? What are the implications?

→ Debate for the second half of class:

- If policymakers, say in the US, want to promote peace, should they promote democracy?
How?
- Is there danger inherent in this line of thinking?
- Is the democratic peace a justification for democratic imperialism?

Instructions -Shelby's Poker Game:

Split section into 4 pairs. One pair is dem-dem, one pair is autocracy-autocracy, and two pairs are dem-autocracy.

Every student gets 15 Hershey Kisses and two cards. The democracy in each pair gets one of these cards face up.

Each player decides if they want to draw a third card. Aim of the game is to get closest to 21, but not over.

Betting takes place. Alternate across rounds which member of the pair starts bidding. The other person in the pair can call (match) or raise the bid, or fold.

Players write down how much they each bid.

Cards are shown.

Repeat for 7 minutes. Students retain their regime identity across rounds.

Regroup.

Students announce what their average bid was. The hope is that, at minimum, the average bids were lower for democracies across pairs.

[I think I will also do a no-bidding practice round where all cards are private before starting the exercise for real. In case you've forgotten rules for 21, Ace can be 1 or 11, card-holder's choice, and Jack, Queen, and King all equal 10.]