Levitsky Argument:

- Ethnic conflict happens when there's an ethnic grievance and an absence of an EFFECTIVE and NEUTRAL state
 - o If no police, people don't believe the state will guarantee protection, people will arm themselves in self-defense just in case
 - o The other group will assume that they might be planning an attack
 - o The causes are uncertainty and fear:
 - Uncertainty about other group's intention
 - Fear that the state won't protect them
 - o In that context, you just need a spark
 - Leads each side to prepare for violence, thereby fulfilling the fear → the ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA

Wilkinson Argument:

- → It's about **electoral incentives** at the local and state levels
- **Town-level** electoral incentives determine where the violence breaks out
 - o **Politicians invoke identities** at the local level.
 - They are more likely to invoke an ethnic identity if:
 - Ethnic identities sustained by social, religious, and economic institutions
 - The number of votes they need to win
 - The degree of ethnic heterogeneity within a constituency
 - Political alliances with other ethnic parties
 - Other races the party is running in
 - o Once they decide which identity, need to make it politically salient to voters
 - Just need to get the swing voters (esp. undecided, uninformed)
 - use ethnic wedge issues for *especially for most competitive seats*
 - Spur counter-mobilization by the other group which can cause ethnic violence
 - → Can we think of examples of this from our country or a country we are familiar with?
- <u>State-level</u> electoral incentives determine where are when state police forces prevent riots.
 - States control local police.

- Politicians in state governments will protect minorities if they are an important part of the support base, or if the electoral system is very fragmented such that the governing party might need to form coalitions with minority supported parties.
- Won't protect minorities if doesn't need their support and won't need it (2 parties)

What factors might make it easier to be in a coalition with the minority?

- o Easier to be in coalition when:
 - But where other cleavages (economic, social etc) are salient, greater willingness to reach out to minority voters
 - low-cost minorities (lower class, just need to give security, not other demands)
 - not the majority in some areas
- → Can we think of an example from the U.S. or a country you are familiar with?

In groups

- → Spend 12 minutes looking through your case article and seeing if the Wilkinson and Levitsky theories apply. I want you to:
 - 1) find evidence for the parts of these theories (electoral incentives, control of the police)
 - 2) determine if any aspects of the case challenge the theories
 - 3) if you finish discussing your particular article, expand the discussion to consider the case more generally (i.e., incorporating information from lecture and the other reading on that case)

Yugoslavia: Whole class discusses the degree to which the theories fit.

Rwanda: Whole class discusses the degree to which the theories fit.