

## Section 9

### Announcements:

- You'll get midterms back on Tuesday.

#### 1) Types of Critiques (handout below)

#### 2) Institutions:

- Rules of the game: "Rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors' behaviors"
- As mentioned in lecture, Huntington thinks that for something to be an institution, it has to be valued for its own sake.
- What are some examples?
  - Constitutions
  - Electoral rules
  - 7 minute rule

#### 2) Informal institutions

- Levitsky and Helmke:
  - "formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official."
  - "informal institutions [are] socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels...a key element of this definition...is that informal institutions must be enforced in some fashion" (5)
    - Different from culture because not nec. tied to societal values.
- What are some examples of formal and informal institutions?
  - Formal
    - College application process
  - Informal
    - 2 term rule until the 22<sup>nd</sup> amendment
    - 7 minute rule

Table from Levitsky and Helmke

	Enforced or complied with Formal Institutions	Not enforced or complied with Formal Institutions
Convergent result	Complementary (enhance efficiency or	Substitutive (achieve what formal rules

	effectiveness, don't violate formal inst) e.g., 2 term rule (until made amendment), logrolling in Congress	were designed to, but failed, to achieve) e.g., in rural Peru, created informal courts.
Divergent result	Accommodating (counteracts without violating) e.g., Chile's democracy by consensus (makes presidency less strong)	Competing (trump the formal rules, causing diverting outcomes that violate the rules) e.g., bribing police in some developing countries

Why should we care about institutions in political science?

- They structure behavior, expectations

Presidential v. Parliamentary Systems

1) Definitions:

- Presidential = fixed terms and executive directly elected
- Parliamentary = non fixed terms and executive elected by parliament

2) Draw table with outcomes, and then pres and parl and what each author says

- What outcomes do we care about with democracy?
- What characteristics of presidential systems positively or negatively impact these outcomes?

Presidential Systems	Parliamentary Systems	Outcomes
Pros +fixed term less prob if reelection or shorter term(M & S) +stable and predictable (M&S) +checks and balances (M&S) <i>(this balances winner-take-all tendencies and gives some semblance of power-sharing)</i> +better accountability and identifiability (M&S) <i>(ppl know what gov they are voting for)</i> +more choice (M&S) <i>(2 electoral choices instead of one)</i> +issues can be considered on	Pros +flexible (Linz) <i>(can dissolve gov if paralysis)</i> +power-sharing (Linz)  Cons -winner-takes-all if majority party in control (M & S) -Dual legitimacy btw houses (M and S) -unstable (M & S) <i>(might be changing a lot. Hard to</i>	Accountability stability Representation Governance

<p>merit, rather than what party wants (M&amp;S)</p> <p>Cons</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Dual Legitimacy (Linz) <i>(divided government brings paralysis and possibly crisis)</i></li> <li>-fixed term (Linz) <i>(hard to govern when president doesn't have majority.)</i> →</li> <li>-winner-take-all (Linz) <i>(those that lose might reject system)</i></li> <li>-can get a political outsider (Linz/M&amp;S)</li> </ul>	<p><i>govern this way)</i></p>	
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What might we be missing in this?

- Mainwaring and Shugart
  - Parliamentary systems have tended to be small, rich, and British
  - Dif institutions within the regime types vary!
    - They think that best presidential systems are where:
      - pres has limited power (then less rule by decree, president steamrolling congress and generating conflict)
      - less fragmentation (i.e., fewer parties), so president and her party will be able to do things. Won't have Congress v. pres crisis
- Mainwaring
  - About the type of presidential system: Multiparty presidentialism.
    - Hard to govern b/c pres party won't nec have a lot of seats and leg. will block president's agenda
    - Ideological polarization exacerbates (b/c losing is a bigger deal)
    - Insti changes to help:

- Concurrent elections (b/c ppl focus on presidency and polarize into camps of 2 biggest contenders and it spills over to leg, decreasing # of parties)
- Changing electoral systems (district magnitude)
- Lipset
  - British rule might be the most imp't factor → Protestantism and British colonialism
  - Quebec v. rest of Canada
- **→ the point is that these things might impact democracy, so we should try to compare similar groups**

Going back to formal and informal institutions, how might informal institutions play a role in the discussion of presidentialism v. parliamentarism?

How do they work together?

- Can help with democratic governance
  - “informal norms of accommodation, power-sharing, and coalition building have helped prevent many of the problems associated with multiparty presidentialism” (11)
  - Example: Brazil and coalitions

How might informal institutions exacerbate the situation?

- Erosion of representation where there's clientelism, vote-buying
- Lack of transparency and accountability, as with the *dedazo*, where the PRI Mexican president chose his successor and the next leader of the party, or with the *concertaciones* where the PRI gave the PAN opposition some governor and mayorships
- Rule of law
- **→** but maybe this has nothing to do with regime-type

Given the “perils of presidentialism,” why have national political institutions in the United States been so stable? Alternatively, could changes to political institutions improve aspects of governance in the US?

If you were helping design the constitution of a country, would you implement presidentialism or parliamentarism?

Where would you fit the apparent deadlock in the U.S. here? Is this just checks and balances at work or is this the kind of thing Linz predicted that could lead to crisis?

If time: Prof. Levitsky talked about how strength might be defined as stability and enforcement in lecture on Monday. How might these concepts add to the discussion?

## Types of critiques (might be handy in papers):

- Theoretical critiques
  - something about the logic is wrong
    - e.g., winner-takes-all not true
  - concept or definitional problem - say something is due to presidentialism when it is really due to a quirk of certain presidential systems
    - e.g., lack of reelection
- Empirical critiques
  - a large variety of these critiques, but within the scope of this class you will probably think mainly about the sample of cases
  - sample - biased in some way?
    - Biased samples have a characteristic that is associated with your comparison groups that actually does the explanatory work
      - e.g., high income countries tend to be parliamentary (so it may be the high income, not the parliament, that leads to stability)
  - one case usually cannot disprove a theory because there is always random noise - But if you find a case that doesn't work with the theory, think instead about making a theoretical critique: how the case illustrates an alternative logic that is possible.
    - Very simple example from last week:
      - Take the argument that weak states make ethnic violence more likely because then the state can't protect people and it causes an ethnic security dilemma.
      - Let's say you want to use Rwanda, where the state actually wasn't that weak, to argue against this argument. Instead of just saying, think about Rwanda and leave it there, you can use the case of Rwanda to make a theoretical critiques.
      - might say that Rwanda suggests that non-neutral state might also cause conflict. This would indicate that the weak state argument misses something. So use the case to make a theoretical point that disagrees with the argument you are arguing against.