

Section 4

Announcements:

- Papers
 - Handing them in
 - Due in lecture on Thursday
 - **VERY IMPORTANT:** THEY SHOULD BE ANONYMOUS. They should not have your name on them, only your Harvard ID.
 - Writing
 - I'm canceling my office hours tomorrow due to lack of sign-ups. I've added more Monday OH. See the doodle.
 - I HIGHLY recommend that you see the handout from the writing session last night. It had great advice on it. Also, there is an example of an A paper on the website.
 - To clarify: Paper should be 5-7 pages. There's been some mixed messages. 5-7, double spaced.
 - **VERY IMPORTANT: Hand out grading guide.** This is very important: We have posted a "grading guide" on the website. I will be explicitly using this as I grade you, so look at it as you are writing and make sure that you have everything there.
 - I want to be sure that we get through everything today, so please email me if you have questions about the paper.

1) The third wave


- a. According to Huntington, what caused the Third Wave of democratization?
 - i. Deepening legitimacy problems
 1. Negative legitimacy (from dem failure) → poor performance undermines legitimacy (oil crisis in the 70s and debt crisis in the 1980s, military defeats)
 - ii. Economic growth
 1. By 1970s, had reached levels of econ development that encouraged democracy → expansion of middle class, education, moderate attitudes (changes in "social structures, beliefs, and culture" (68))
 - iii. Catholic church
 1. Vatican II in 1960's changed Church policy to be against human rights abuses, need for social change etc. → national churches opposing regimes, helped pro-dem movements
 - iv. External actors
 1. Have to be democracy to be in EU
 2. U.S. policy changed under Carter and Reagan to not support human rights abuses → led to economic pressure, diplomacy, support for dem forces etc.)
 - v. "snowballing"

1. demonstration effects that it could happen and how
 2. aided by changes in technology
- b. Is his argument dependent on the specific time period he was looking at? How does the international context play into Huntington's theory?

2) Competitive Authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way)

- a. Huntington missed competitive authoritarianism, which is when "regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair" (5)
- i. Examples? What does this look like?

- b. Graph the arg



- i. Linkage = density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) btw countries and US/EU
 1. Heightens the salience of international abuse, increases likelihood of western response, more domestic actors with stake in avoiding int isolation, so balance of power in resources and prestige to opposition → auth regimes abandon in face of opposition
 - ii. Organizational capacity = "well organized and cohesive, organizational tools to prevent elite defection, steal elections, or crack down on protest" → auth
 - iii. Leverage = "vulnerability to western democratizing pressure"
- c. What does Huntington miss that Levitsky and Way point out?
- i. Domestic factors → strength of the state

- ii. Different types of international factors can have a bigger impact (linkage more important than leverage)

Definitions of “rents”:

According to [Robert Tollison](#) (1982), economic rents are "excess returns" above "normal levels" that take place in competitive markets.

[Henry George](#), best known for his proposal for a [single tax on land](#), defined *rent* as "the part of the produce that accrues to the owners of land (or other natural capabilities) by virtue of ownership" and as "the share of wealth given to landowners because they have an exclusive right to the use of those natural capabilities."^[8]

Professors of law [Lucian Bebchuk](#) and [Jesse Fried](#) define the term "to refer to extra returns that firms or individuals obtain due to their positional advantages."^[9]

3) Authoritarianism (***Draw out the argument for an article. 2-3 people each one. If you finish early, do another one***)

a. The middle east and North African Exceptionalism

i. Oil (Ross)

1. Oil →

- a. rentier effect (low taxes/low accountability demands + high spending on patronage so fewer pressures for dem + prevent formation of social groups indep from state) +
- b. repression effect (spend more on security forces b/c have the money to do so and might be ethnic conflict) +
- c. modernization effect (population not in industrial or service jobs, no rising ed levels and autonomous workforce)
 - i. → keep public demobilized → authoritarianism

ii. Coercive apparatus (Bellin)

- 1. Fiscal health (to fund security apparatus, comes from dif things like oil) +
- 2. international support (for aid and legitimacy, b/c Islamic threat and crucial resource) +
- 3. patrimonialism (favoring one group/family guarantee loyalty, corruption and resistance to reform) +
- 4. level of popular mobilization remains low or costs of repression low (with “islamists” protesting and secular middle class in fear)
 - a. → states’ coercive apparatus has the “Will and capacity” to suppress democratic initiative

- i. → authoritarianism (no dem transition initiated)
 - iii. Monarchies (Yom and Gause)
 - 1. Monarchies in Middle East →
 - a. Cross-cutting coalitions (secure interests of biz class, religious auth, policy guarantees, nationalist appeals) +
 - b. rents (from oil or foreign aid for welfare or foreign aid, which make population dependent on the regime) +
 - c. foreign patrons (help with diplomatic legitimacy, aid and military intervention – host U.S. bases, keep oil production high etc.) → lowers cost of repression
 - i. → authoritarianism
 - iv. **After going through the charted arguments:**
 - 1. **On which points do these authors agree?**
 - 2. **What about the cultural argument? What would Huntington say? What do you think about this argument?**
 - 3. **To what degree do these arguments generalize beyond the middle east?**

b. China

- i. CCP's institutionalization (Nathan)
 - 1. Regime's institutionalization = succession (rules and peaceful) + meritocratic promotion (no purging, high morale, less factionalized) + differentiation of institutions (more professional, autonomous army, congress, courts etc.)+ institutions of political participation (all people can be in party, more indep mass media, consultative conferences etc.)
 - a. → stable authoritarianism
- ii. Repression, economic statism, cooptation (Pei)
 - 1. Refined repression ("selective" or "smart" repression) + economic statism (tight control over state-owned enterprises and dole out patronage w/ appointments, benefits to constituents) + political cooptation (elevating political class and intelligentsia, private entrepreneurs) → stable authoritarianism
 - a. But corruption, modernization (more elites than can be coopted), and new opposition threaten these strategies
 - 2. "Theories of authoritarian survival all share a common feature: they turn theories of democratic transition

upside down. Specifically, they attempt either to identify the *absence* of factors normally favorable to democratic transition or to pinpoint the *presence* of unfavorable factors associated with the prevention of democratic transition.” (28)

- a. What does he mean here? Why might this be a problem?

iii. Revolutionary Regime (Levitsky and Way)

1. “We define rev regimes as those which emerge out of sustained, ideological, and violent struggle from below, and whose establishment is accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order” (5)
 - a. destruction of independent power centers (justification and means to destroy army, political organizations, churches, elites) +
 - b. cohesive ruling parties (military struggle makes military-style discipline, partisan identities, opposition linked to historical enemy so cost of defection high, extraordinary legitimacy) +
 - c. tight partisan control over security forces (because they remake the state!) +
 - d. powerful coercive apparatuses (because existential threats)
 - i. → stable authoritarian (rev regimes)
2. after rev generation, can get stability and legitimacy through econ performance, renewed conflict, institutionalized leadership succession,

- 1. Are the Arab monarchies (Yom and Guase) or the CCP (Pei, Nathan) more resilient according to the pieces we read? Which of these two sets of countries is more likely to transition to democracy sooner? Why?**
- 2. Do these arguments vindicate modernization theory?**