#### Section Plan:

I. A note on papers

II. Discussion

III. Next week's readings

#### I. A note on papers:

-answer the question by developing your own argument

-provide textual evidence

-demonstrate understanding of the causal logic of theories and develop a logically coherent argument yourself

-If you choose topic two, you would probably be best served by choosing EITHER development OR democracy as an outcome -Any questions about the submission of papers?

## I. What caused the third wave of democratization? Do all Huntington's proposals seem equally plausible to you? Why or why not?

#### HUNTINGTON: THE THIRD WAVE (1991)

-explaining waves: single cause (superpower), parallel development (economic growth), snowballing (demonstration effects), prevailing nostrum (different causes but same intermediate variable [zeitgeist] leads elites to have same response) -Why did the third wave happen? why did it happen when it did (1970s and 1980s)

-patterns:

cyclical: a-d-a-d-a-d second-try: A-d-a-D interrupted democracy: A-D-a-D direct translation: A-D decolonization: D/a-A

-Changes in the 1960s and 1970s that produced democratization in the 1970s and 1980s

#### 1). deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems

-context: global democratic ethos

-development of authoritarian regimes legitimacy a). negative legitimacy (benefit from past democracy's failures) b). poor performance undermines legitimacy (oil and debt crises, military failures)

#### 2). unprecedented global economic growth in the 1960s/Economic crises

-oil crises led to economic downturns

-by 1970s levels of development allowed democracy

-dev-> educated public/larger middle class--> civic attitudes --> support for democratization

-extremely rapid economic growth destabilized authoritarian regimes

#### 3). Changes in christianity

-Christianity advances in South Korea

-doctrinal changes in the Catholic church

-opposition to autocracy (Vatican II & John 23)

-leftist developments among clergy/ liberation theology

-intervention at critical moments

#### 4). Changes in policy of external actors

-European Community (today EU)

-American policy (carter and reagan)

#### 5). Snowballing (demonstration effects)

-showed it could be done -showed how it could be done -showed dangers to avoid

## II. COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: What defines competitive authoritarian regimes?

competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents

#### Case of Uganda – what kind of regime is this?

Why did they begin to appear at the moment in history in which they did? What factors affect their trajectories toward full democratization, stable authoritarianism or unstable authoritarianism? Do any of the factors that Huntington says lead to democracy also encourage competitive authoritarianism?

#### LEVITSKY AND WAY: COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM

	Democracy	Competitive Authoritarianism	Full Authoritarianism
Status of Core Democratic Institutions	Systematically respected. Widely viewed as only route to power	Exist and are meaningful, but are systematically violated to benefit the incumbent. Widely viewed as primary route to power	Nonexistent or reduced to façade status. not viewed as route to power
Status of opposition	Competes with more or less equal footing with incumbent	Legal and can compete openly, but significantly disadvantaged by incumbent abuse	Major opposition is banned or largely underground or in exile
Level of uncertainty	High	Lower than democracy but higher than full authoritarianism	Low

See table 1.1., page 13


competitive authoritarianism as a post-Cold War phenomenon -end of soviet union/superpower support for different regimes -dominance of the west -new western foreign policy -proliferation of INGOs

Eventual outcomes of competitive authoritarianism: full democratization, unstable autocracy, stable autocracy

-High linkages --> democratization

-low linkage means we go to domestic factors: ruling party has high organizational capacity --> stable autocracy

-where ruling party is fragmented, go to leverage: weak ruling party + the west has lots of leverage --> unstable competitive authoritarianism



How does resource wealth affect regime type? What are the mechanisms for this effect? Do we see evidence of this in this week's cases?

#### ROSS: DOES OIL HINDER DEMOCRACY?

Does oil impede democracy?

how would it work? Rentier effect: taxation effect (less taxation-people less invested in holding gov't accountable), spending effect (use resources to buy off dissent), group formation (revenues prevent social groups/social capital). Repression effect: resources let governments build big armies and cause big armies because governments respond to increased probability of conflict. modernization effect: modernization doesn't happen when wealth comes from resources

#### results:

-oil impedes democracy, valid and robust, not just in the middle east. Mineral wealth (not just oil) impedes democratization. Tentative support for rentier (low tax, high spending) repression (internal security) and modernization effects (no industrialization dampens push for democracy)

# Cases: What allows democracy to thrive in unlikely places (Varshney?) What prevents democratic transitions (Bellin)? What prevents democratic consolidation (Fish)?

#### VARSHNEY: INDIA DEFIES THE ODDS (1998)

Why has democracy survived in India? Reasons are 1). historical 2). economic 3). ethnic 4). political leadership

#### 1). Historical

-british institutions interact with National Congress strategy (non-violent, made british less likely to crush them and more likely to question own legitimacy). This allowed Congress to take over institutions and build mass party that mobilized Indians 2). economic

-green revolution allowed peasants and democracy

-before that, Nehru chose democracy over development because he knew trying to extract too much from peasants in an effort to cause rapid industrialization would put democracy at risk

3). ethnic

-most ethnic conflicts are locally based (punjab sikh-hindu, kashmir for muslim separatists)

-castes are also locally based

-local conflict need not spill over

-one threat is hindu-muslim fault line and BJP in particular

-BJP not likely to implement their ideology because muslims have been non-violent,

courts have protected civili liberties & caste differences prevent hindu unity

4). political leadership

Nehru - underutilized power

#### FISH: DEMOCRACY DERAILED IN RUSSIA (2005)

Russia is not a democracy as per Dahl's criteria:

-Abuse of administrative resources: soft coercion (i.e. getting employees to vote how you want them to), government-managed absentee voting, hard coercion (murder, detention of journalists)

-fourth criterion (practically all adults can run for office): nope, russia disqualifies people for political reasons (i.e. to protect the president)

-constriction of civil liberties: limitations on political communication, rights of association

Economic policy in Russia:

-Russia carried out a hodgepodge of half-reforms, not shock therapy

-no post-communist state carried out gradualism because didn't have the capacity in the form of capable, non corrupt bureaucracy. Instead, states liberalized more or less rapidly

-civil society is weak, political parties are weak, possibly due to economic stabilization policies

BELLIN: ROBUSTNESS OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2004) Why has so much of the middle east never experienced democratic transitions? Answer: the will and capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to suppress the democratic transition Robustness of coercive apparatus: -fiscal health, international support networks, inversely related to institutionalization of security forces, level of popular mobilization

III. Next week's readings:

-Skocpol isn't easy, but not a lot of pages -Read her with Selbin, which is a critique of her argument -should try to do the reading because it's less than 120 pages

#### I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### **European Union Election Observation Mission**

Elections for the President of Uganda, 238 Members of Parliament in regular constituencies and 112 women Members of Parliament in the district constituencies reserved for women took place on 18 February 2011.

[...]

#### **Overall conclusion**

The 2011 Ugandan general elections showed some improvements over the previous elections held in 2006. However, the electoral process was marred by avoidable administrative and logistical failures which led to an unacceptable number of Ugandan citizens being disenfranchised. Furthermore, the power of incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the level playing field between the competing candidates and political parties. Notwithstanding a number of incidents of violence and intimidation, especially on Election Day, the electoral campaign and polling day were generally conducted in a peaceful manner. Restraint in campaign rhetoric contributed to this improved campaign environment. With genuine political commitment by all stakeholders, further progress towards a fully pluralistic and multi-party democracy can be achieved.

#### Legal framework

Uganda's legal framework offers a workable and detailed foundation for the conduct of democratic elections, generally in accordance with the nation's international, regional and constitutional commitments and obligations. Remaining legislative shortcomings call for amendments to level the playing field; to deter illegal practices; to enhance public confidence in the Electoral Commission's independence; and to guarantee universal, direct and equal suffrage for all seats of Parliament.

#### [...]

#### **Election Administration**

The Electoral Commission devised its Election Roadmap several years in advance of the elections and generally abided by its timetable. However preparations eventually succumbed to the excessive pressure of administering presidential and direct parliamentary elections, while also administering several stages of nationwide polling for Special Interest Group youth elections and simultaneously preparing for imminent local elections. The Electoral Commission did not enjoy widespread trust.

#### [...]

#### Campaign period

The almost four month long official campaign period was conducted in an atmosphere in which the freedoms of assembly and association were generally respected. Presidential candidates campaigned intensively and were mostly able to move freely throughout the country. The campaign schedule adopted by the Electoral Commission and its adherence by presidential candidates was a major factor contributing to the relative calm and peacefulness of the campaign. However, the increase in campaign spending and "monetisation" of the election were major concerns. The distribution of money and gifts by candidates, especially from the ruling party, a practice inconsistent with democratic principles, was widely observed by EU EOM observers deployed across Uganda. It was evident that the National Resistance Movement's dominance and resources were much greater than those of the opposition. In addition it was difficult to draw a line between the government and the ruling party at the local level: despite the bar against partisanship of civil servants, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and agents of various security services were omnipresent, occasionally taking a pro-active role in the electoral process.

#### Media

The state-owned broadcaster, the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), failed to comply with its legal obligations to treat each presidential and parliamentary candidate equally. The UBC television channel gave the incumbent president and the ruling National Resistance Movement party substantially more coverage than their nearest rivals. The government's dominance of state-owned radio, the only broadcasting network covering almost all areas of the country, was not balanced by private radio stations established outside the capital, which generally provided opposition candidates with very limited access.

#### [...]

#### The role of the security forces

While the Ugandan People's Defence Forces exercised more restraint in the use of force than in 2006, the Uganda Police Force has not yet embraced its constitutional role as an impartial enforcer against breaches of electoral law. Lack of police impartiality frustrates citizens' expectations of compliance with the legal framework.

#### [...]

#### Polling and counting

Election Day unfolded peacefully for the most part, but poor application of basic procedures revealed inadequate training of polling station staff and implied insufficient safeguards against fraud. Disturbingly high numbers of citizens found that they were not registered where they expected, leading to confusion and avoidable instances of disenfranchisement.

#### [...]

#### Civil society observation

Civil society showed itself to be vibrant and committed to supporting the democratic process. The work carried out by civil society groups such as the Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda was key to voter education. In addition the Electoral Commission accredited 39 domestic observation missions. Of these, the Democracy Monitoring Group and Citizens Election Watch in particular carried out long-term observation and provided a regular platform to improve citizens' awareness of the process.

#### New Vision

#### Uganda: Opposition Parties Draft Electoral Reforms

BY MOSES MULONDO, 17 SEPTEMBER 2013

Kampala — Opposition parties have completed compiling the necessary constitutional and electoral reforms which they want to be passed early enough ahead of the 2016 elections.

One of these reforms is the creation of an independent electoral commission agreed upon by stakeholders.

In an exclusive interview with New Vision, the FDC spokesman Wafula Oguttu on Monday said they have notified the speaker of parliament to put them on the order paper to present these proposed reforms on the floor of parliament.

The opposition also wants the presidential term limits re-instated and the powers of the president reduced.

Concerning the army, they want the army MPs removed from parliament and the military delinked from electoral processes.

The opposition parties are also pushing for regional governments to be given federal status.

For politicians who are removed from their seats on grounds of rigging, the opposition wants a law that, as punishment, will stop such people from contesting in any other future election.

The parties also want the affirmative action representation to be reviewed in the drive for a lean parliament so as to reduce the cost of public administration.

About two week ago, former Vice President Prof. Gilbert Balibaseka Bukenya, who announced he will stand for the presidency in 2016, also sounded a similar call for urgent attention on the necessary constitutional and electoral reforms to guarantee free and fair elections.

"Our wish is to have these electoral reforms passed before this year ends so that we can have adequate time to sensitize the voters about the electoral laws," Wafula said.

The FDC official explained that in the course of drafting these reforms, they widely consulted various political parties and the civil society.

He called upon development partners, the civil society, government, and other stakeholders to give the matter urgent attention.

"Uganda's political ground is not leveled. We need these reforms to be able to have free and fair elections. Without these reforms, 2016 is likely to be chaotic because we can no longer accept rigging," Wafula elaborated.

The opposition shadow attorney general, Abdu Katuntu, who has been tasked to table a private member's bill, said on Monday they will have completed drafting the piece of legislation within the next two weeks.

"I am the principle legal advisor for the entire opposition, so other opposition leaders are also involved in this process. The constitutional amendments we are fronting are so many," Katuntu said.

He said the list of constitutional amendments they want is very long, some of which include the Presidential Election Act, the political parties and organizations Act, the administration of parliament Act and the Electoral Commission Act.

Castigating the Electoral Commission for failing to slap sanctions on parties which don't submit their financial statements, the FDC publicist (Wafula) said whereas they have been complying in submitting annual reports of their audited accounts, ruling NRM and other parties have not been doing so.

But Electoral Commission spokesperson Jotham Talemwa said "those main parties including NRM, UPC, FDC and DP have been complying although their levels of compliance differ".

Wafula also said FDC wants government to reduce on State House expenditures and other government expenditures to create money to cater for the 20% pay rise the teachers are demanding for.

### **Defund Obamacare?**

www.newsmax.com/surveys

Do You Support a Government Shutdown? Vote in Urgent Poll.

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